The level of detail provided in CCNPP Unit 3 COL FSAR Section 6.4.3 is not adequate to determine if the regulatory requirements are met. Provide in the FSAR the essential elements of the training procedures necessary to demonstrate that the regulatory requirements are met. Specifically, what will operators be directed and trained to do to meet the recommendations in RG 1. 196.
Please address / discuss the applicability of the following:
" Regulatory Position C5, "Emergency Planning" of Regulatory Guide 1.78 " Regulatory Position 2.5, "Hazardous Chemicals" of Regulatory Guide 1.196 " Regulatory Position 2.2.1, "Comparison of System Design, Configuration, and Operation with the Licensing Basis" of Regulatory Guide 1.196; and " Regulatory Position 2.7.1, "Periodic Evaluations and Maintenance" of Regulatory Guide
1.196
Include a discussion of what operators will be directed to do when they smell toxic gas or are notified by external sources that there was a toxic gas release. Include a discussion of any arrangements that will be in place for notifying the control room when a release has occurred.
Response
The Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit 3 COLA will be revised to include additional details of operator's actions and training during toxic gas release scenarios. See COLA Impact. A COL applicant that references the U.S. EPR design certification will provide written emergency planning and procedures in the event of a radiological or hazardous chemical release within or near the plant, and will provide training of control room personnel.
This COL Item is addressed as follows:
{Calvert Cliffs 3 Nuclear Project, LLC and UniStar Nuclear Operating Services, LLC} shall provide written emergency planning and procedures for use in the event of a radiological or hazardous chemical release within or near the plant, and will provide training of control room personnel, prior to receipt of fuel onsite at {CCNPP Unit 3}. {For CCNPP Unit 3, detection of toxic gases and subsequent isolation of the CRE is not required and is not part of the site-specific system operation. The evaluation of the CCNPP Unit 3 toxic chemicals in Section 2.2.3 did not identify any credible toxic chemical accidents that exceed the limits established in Regulatory Guide 1.78 (NRC, 2001) . No specific provisions are required to protect the operators from an event involving the release of a toxic gas. As a result, toxic gas detectors and isolation are not required and will not be provided at CCNPP Unit 3.) The following question is related to Unit 3 Control Room Habitability in case of Unit 1 or 2 DBAs. GDC 19 requires that control room occupants must be protected from radiation exposure of nearby units' DBAs. COL applicants either have to confirm that the radiation exposure of MCR occupants resulting from a DBA at a nearby unit is bounded by the radiation exposure analysis of the DC plant, or confirm that the limits of GDC 19 are met.
The response to RAI 83, Question 06.04-4 showed that the U.S. EPR radiological analysis bounds the radiological consequences of a DBA either at Unit 1 or Unit 2 and proposed a revision to Section 6.2.4 of the CCNPP Unit 3 FSAR. The staff has determined that more information is necessary to determine if GDC 19 is met.
Provide a new revision to Section 6.2.4 of the CCNPP Unit 3 COL FSAR that addresses the habitability of the Unit 3 control room without discussing the habitability of the Unit 1 or Unit 2 control room, and describe in detail the logic that led to the conclusion that the U.S. EPR radiological analysis bounds the consequences of DBAs either at Unit 1 or Unit 2.
The impacted Tier 2 CCNPP Unit 3 COLA FSAR Section is 6.4.4, and not 6.2.4 as listed in the question.
The CCNPP Unit 3 MCR habitability was evaluated for a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) at CCNPP Unit 2 as this is more bounding than a LOCA at Unit 1 due to the distance between the units. The analysis was based on the guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 1.183 and the NRC-approved RADTRAD model in the Safety Evaluation for the Units 1 and 2 implementation of the Alternative Radiological Source Term, with the following modifications:
* Use of site-specific atmospheric dispersion factors for transport of post-LOCA releases from Unit 2 to the Unit 3 MCR intake for filtered air flow and unfiltered in-leakage, as shown in Table 1 , and * Use of the Unit 3 MCR characteristics as given in U.S. EPR FSAR Table 15 .0-18 with one exception-actuation of the MCR emergency filtration system (for filtered intake flow and filtered recirculation) was based on 30-minute operator action, in lieu of automatic actuation as a result of high radiation levels in the intake duct. Although it is expected that the emergency filtration system would get actuated by the intake duct radiation monitors in less than 30 minutes, this was not credited in the analysis.
It was determined that the Unit 3 MCR dose from a Unit 2 LOCA would be 0.2 rem TEDE, which is significantly lower than the acceptance criterion in 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 19, as incorporated by reference in 10 CFR 52.79(a)(4)(i) (5 rem TEDE).
With respect to direct shine to MCR personnel from post-LOCA external and contained sources, it was determined that their contribution to the total dose would be minimal. Radiation emanating from the external plume would be attenuated by the 6-ft concrete structure protecting the Unit 3 MCR, and radiation emanating from the MCR charcoal filtration system would be shielded by a 50-cm concrete floor.
Enclosure UN#1 1-114 Page 5 of 8 This section of the U.S. EPR FSAR is incorporated by reference with the following supplements {and departures).
The U.S. EPR FSAR includes the following COL Item in Section 6.4.4:
A COL applicant that references the U.S. EPR design certification will confirm that the radiation exposure of MCR occupants resulting from a DBA at a nearby unit on a multi-unit site is bounded by the radiation exposure from the postulated design basis accidents analyzed for the U.S. EPR; or confirm that the limits of GDC 19 are met.
{The main coentrol room (MCR) doase to CCGNPP Un1its; 1 and 2 from a GCCNPP Unit 3 LOCGA. i qs less, than 2.0 rem total effective dose equivalent (TEDE). This dose is beo the regulatory doee acceptance criterion. of 5-re~m TEMPE. The CCNPP Unit 32 MR from a CCNPP Unit 3 LOCA, which also meets the regulatory dose acceptance criterion of 5 rem TEDE.
The CCNPP Unit 3 MGR is equipped with safety related radiation moenitors in h -AC intke duc-I,-ts -nwould isolate in a timely manner. The CCNPP Unit 3 MCA HVA" ene•rgency filtration system design basis accident -cnfiguration is desribed iR U.S. EPR FSAR 15.0.3.) {The CCNPP Unit 3 main control room (MCR) habitability was evaluated for a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) at CCNPP Unit 2. A CCNPP Unit 2 LOCA is more bounding than a LOCA at CCNPP Unit 1 due to the distance between the units. The analysis was based on the guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 1.183 (NRC, 2000) and the NRC-approved RADTRAD model in the Safety Evaluation for the CCNPP Units 1 and 2 implementation of the Alternative Radiological Source Term (NRC, 2007b) , with the following modifications:
* Use of site-specific atmospheric dispersion factors for transport of post-LOCA releases from CCNPP Unit 2 to the CCNPP Unit 3 MCR intake for filtered air flow and unfiltered in-leakage, as shown in Table 6 .4-1, and * Use of the CCNPP Unit 3 MCR characteristics as given in U.S. EPR FSAR Table 15 .0-18 with one exception -actuation of the MCR emergency filtration system (for filtered intake flow and filtered recirculation) was based on 30-minute operator action, in lieu of automatic actuation as a result of high radiation levels in the intake duct. Although it is expected that the emergency filtration system would get actuated by the intake duct radiation monitors in less than 30 minutes, this was not credited in the analysis.
